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NOTES
FIRM NOTES WITH INDIVIDUAL SIGNATURES OF
PARTNERS.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has always prided itself
on the fact that in the interpretation of any document, be it a
statute, a will, a deed, a contract, it has always given effect to
the intention expressed, or implied in the language, in prefer-
ence to technical rules; but in one instance, at leabt, it has de-
viated from this correct principle in an unequivocal manner,
namely: In failing to give the intended effect to a partner's
signature under the signature of his firm on a promissory note.
The court held that in as much as the signature of the firm al-
ready obligates all the members of the firm, the signature of the
partner under that of his firm cannot be given any value, but
must be treated as surplusage. In case of the insolvency of the
firm the payee of the note takes only a dividend from the part-
nership estate and cannot get a dividend from the insolvent
estate of the partner.' That this is contrary to the intention of
the parties to the note is apparent. The creditor would not
sell the goods, or give to the debtor firm further time for pay-
ment upon the obligation of the firm alone; he also required the
separate obligation of the partner before parting with his goods,
before granting time; he insisted on a double undertaking: that
of the firm and that of the individual partner, so that he could
levy his execution both on firm property and the individual prop-
erty of the signing partners; so that in case of insolvency of
firm and partner he might prove his claims against both insolvent
estates. Yet the courts would deprive the creditor of the fruit
of his greater caution by allowing him a dividend only out of the
firm estate, though the contract for the double dividend was
lawful and not against public policy.
How unjust this principle is will appear clearly if we read
carefully the decision of Judge Sprague of the United States
District Court in 1843, supporting a double dividend, on which
and in the learned opinion accompanying the same in Re: Far-
'Fayette National Bank v. .Kenney's Assignee, 79 Ky. 133.
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num2, the Federal rule is based which has prevailed under
the bankruptcy laws of 1840, 1867 and 1898, though the letter
of these statutes might have left the door open for adopting the
rule which our Court of Appeals has adopted. In that opinion
the learned judge shows that though the English rule does not
permit two dividends it is, as counsel as well as the judges in all
the cases admit, based not on reason nor on equity but only on
ancient usage which the conservative English jurists were un-
willing to break through because it was more convenient to fol-
low it. That the rule was also contrary to the common law
which in case of a firm and individual signatures permitted the
creditor to levy both on firm and individual property until satis-
fied in full. He therefore did not feel bound to follow the Eng-
lish rule contrary to law and equity as no American precedents
nor a statute compelled him to do so.
The Court of Appeals gives as reason for not permitting
two proofs and dividends that to do so would be contrary to the
rule established in Kentucky by the decision in Northern Bank
of Kentucky v. Keiser. That rule, however, is only to the effect
that if the firm creditors have exhausted the firm estate they
can not come against the individual estate until after the indi-
vidual creditors have received out of the individual estate an
equal dividend with the firm creditors. I can not see the conflict
between the Keiser rule and the rule of two proofs and dividends
but think that the two rules may be easily reconciled. After the.
firm creditors have exhausted the firm estate they must wait
until the individual creditors including the creditor who has the
firm and individual signatures to his note, have received a divi-
dend equal to that received by the firm creditors. *Where is
then the conflict?
As long as the bankruptcy act of 1898 is in force this ques-
tion may be considered as academic only; but cases may arise
when an insolvent estate is allowed to be wound up in the state
court. Will the latter be bound to adhere to a rule which is
neither just nor equitable and which, as pointed out at the
beginning, runs counter to the intention of both parties?
0. A. WEHLE,
Louisville, Ky. Attorney-at-Law.
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